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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been estimated that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas.”1 Given these strikingly high statistics, it is
no wonder that it is widely agreed that plea bargaining "is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system."2 With such emphasis placed on plea bargaining in the
United States criminal justice system, a watchful eye must be kept
on the procedures prosecutors prescribe in obtaining the
overwhelming majority of their convictions.3 This is ever-important

1. Judge John L. Kane, Plea Bargaining and the Innocent: It’s Up to Judges
to Restore Balance, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, www.themarshallproject.org/
2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-the-innocent (last visited October 20, 2016).
2. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012) (quoting Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1912 (1992)).
3. Kane, supra note 1.
839
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today as a recent, invidious trend has begun to develop over the last
half-century, ushering in era where the rights of criminal
defendants in the plea-bargaining process have withered on the
vine.4 This trend began in United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196
(1994), where it was held that a criminal defendant’s rights under
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 (“Fed. R. Evid. 410”) could be waived
such that statements made during a plea negotiation that were
later withdrawn from could be used to impeach a defendant.5 More
recently, many prosecutors have begun to demand that defendants
agree to waive their rights under Fed. R. Evid. 410, to the extent
that if “[plea] negotiations fail and the case goes to trial, any
statements defendants make during negotiations are admissible
against them in the government’s case-in-chief.”6
As a matter of law, this article will demonstrate how this
practice reaches well-beyond the scope of Fed. R. Evid. 410 and
must be constrained to ensure that Congress’ original intent is
honored in order to avoid raising the specter of wrongful
convictions7 and to protect against the dissipation of rights for
criminal defendants that already persists in this nearly allencompassing arena of justice.8 Following this introduction Section
II will conduct an examination into the history behind plea
bargaining, its constitutionality, and its ascendancy to nearuniversal application in criminal cases.9 In Section III, the
subversion of the language of Fed. R. Evid. 410 and the drafter’s
intent therein, is scrutinized to expose how Fed. R. Evid. 410’s
current utilization debases the rule’s true meaning and purpose.10
This will be followed by a look into how Fed. R. Evid. 410 was
originally undermined in Mezzanatto, opening the door to
prosecutors’ present attempts at rendering the rule toothless.11
Then, a recount of a taxonomy of cases stretching across several
jurisdictions that have upheld this perversion of the Fed. R. Evid.
410 will be detailed to unearth its expanding acceptance,
highlighting the need for the Supreme Court of the United States
to intervene and restore the rights of criminal defendants enshrined

4. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 142 (2013).
5. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1994).
6. FISHER, supra note 4, at 142.
7. Bruce A. Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and PostConviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 491 (2009).
8. Kane, supra note 1.
9. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 540 (1897); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970).
10. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 215 (1994) (Souter J. dissenting) (stating
that “if the generally applicable (and generally sound) judicial policy of
respecting waivers of rights and privileges should conflict with a reading of the
Rules as reasonably construed to accord with the intent of Congress, there is no
doubt that congressional intent should prevail”); but see contra United States v.
Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 2009).
11. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 205.
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in the rule.12 Section IV details a proposal on how these issues
should be addressed on both a judicial and legislative level while
pinpointing the pathologies the current landscape poses on criminal
defendants, the criminal justice system, and society at large.
Finally, in Section V, a brief summary of these overall issues, and
my proposals as to how to address them will be rehashed with one
final reminder that action must be taken to prevent Fed. R. Evid
410 case-in-chief waivers.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Context
An ever-widening purview of rights that criminal defendants
may waive has continued to broaden, stripping individuals of some
of their most fundamental protections against governmental
attempts to take one’s life, liberty, or property.13 While the practice
of permitting rights to be waived is well entrenched in the United
States criminal justice system, and often for good reason, it was not
intended to provide prosecutors with carte blanche to continue to
manufacture new and more deleterious ways in which such rights
may be impinged at their convenience.14 Yet, before examining the
current prosecutorial, and for that matter, judicial overreach that
seeks to extend this trend beyond all legal capacity, a perusal of
historical context and precedent is necessary to understand how the
United States criminal justice system has arrived at where it is
today.15 In doing so, a brief history of plea bargaining will be
accounted, as well as how the standards for confessions led to the
construction for constitutional pleas in order to prevent against the
very type governmental coercion at issue in this article. Next, a look
at Fed. R. Evid. 410(a) itself, and the Congressional intent behind
it, as well as how a waiver of one’s rights applies in the current
context.
1. Plea Bargaining, From the Beginning
As aforementioned, plea bargaining today “is the criminal
justice system.”16 However, this should not come as a surprise as
12. Contra United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997 (2011); contra United
States v. Jim 786 F.3d 802 (2012); contra United States v. Washburn 728 F.3d
775 (2013).
13. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) (observing that that
entry of a guilty plea involves waiver of the right against self-incrimination, the
right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers); United States v.
Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.D.C. 1997).
14. Bram, 168 U.S. at 539.
15. Id.; Brady, 397 U.S. at 742-743 (1970); Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201.
16. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407–08 (emphasis added).
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such negotiations have been a relative mainstay throughout
American criminal justice history.17 One of the first cases to detail
a plea bargain, known as a “charge bargain” at the time, was an
1808 case involving Josiah Stevens. Stevens was a “common seller”
of alcohol who faced a four-count indictment for operating without
a liquor license.18 The court’s clerk reported that “the said Josiah
[Stevens] says he will not contend with the Commonwealth. And
Samuel Davis Esquire Atty. for the Commonwealth in this behalf
says that… he will not prosecute the first and third counts against
him any further.”19 Thus, when Stevens pled nolo contendere, “[he]
spared [himself] any admission of guilt while giving the court the
power to convict and sentence [him].”20
2. Voluntary and Intelligent
While the case involving Stevens was one of the first plea
bargains to be on record, this case was by no means revolutionary.21
“In the Court of General Sessions of the Peace… seventy-three
percent of adjudicated cases in 1789-1790 ended in plea, and sixtysix percent of those in 1799-1800.”22 These statistics were high, in
essence affirming the advantages plea bargaining has consistently
offered the criminal justice system,23 prosecutors,24 and even
defendants.25 However, it was not until the modern standards of
voluntary and intelligent confessions were established,26 which
paved the way to how plea bargains would be reviewed,27 that such

17. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 21, (2003).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 23 (alteration in original).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 22.
23. See Monroe Legal Group, Plea Bargaining and Judicial Economy,
FINDLAW (Nov. 5. 2017) www.criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/pleabargains-and-judicial-economy.html (observing how “the primary benefit of
plea bargains to a judge is that plea bargains reduce their already crowded
calendar of court cases”).
24. Paul Bergman and Sara J. Bergman, Why Judges and Prosecutors
Engage in Plea Bargaining, NOLO (Nov. 5, 2016), www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/why-judges-prosecutors-engage-plea-bargaining.html; see also
FISHER, supra note 17.
25. See What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Accepting a Plea
Bargain?, LEGAL RESOURCES (Nov. 6, 2016), www.hg.org/article.asp?id=33881
(detailing how plea bargaining presents the following advantages to criminal
defendants: lighter sentences; reduced charges; cost savings, and finality of the
case).
26. See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (finding that “waivers of
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing,
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences”).
27. Bram, 168 U.S. at 532 (1897).
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reliance on plea bargains ascended to its current ubiquity.28
a. Confessions and Plea Bargaining
In order to understand how modern plea bargaining is
governed, it is first necessary to understand the elements of a valid
confession as the latter gave way to the former.29 In the seminal
case, Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court
reviewed a conviction whereby defendant, Bram, was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death.30 The key aspect of Bram’s
conviction turned on whether the purported confession Bram gave,
without counsel, to a detective could be admitted into evidence at
trial.31 In reviewing this confession, the Court sought to implement
structures that ensured the efficacy of the Fifth Amendment such
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."32 To do this, the Court re-emphasized the
English common law maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, and
turned to the treatise Russel on Crimes which imparted:
A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has
been influenced by any threat or promise; for the law cannot measure
the force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind
of the prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree
of influence has been exerted.33

From there, the Court held that “[a] confession… must be free
and voluntary: that is, it must not be extracted by any sort of threats
or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.”34 Therefore,
“[t]he true test of admissibility is that a confession is made freely,
voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.”35
The Court’s application of these principles to the facts revealed that
Bram’s confession was not voluntary and thus, improperly admitted
rendering the judgment’s reversal.36

28. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992).
29. Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal
Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
2011, 2033 (2000).
30. Bram, 168 U.S. at 532.
31. Id. at 536.
32. Id. at 539.
33. WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, ON CRIMES 478 (1819); Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574 (1883); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896); Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
34. RUSSELL, supra note 33, at 478 (emphasis added).
35. Bram, 168 U.S. at 543 (1897) (holding that the general rule that the
confession must be free and voluntary, that is, not produced by inducements
engendering either hope or fear, is settled by the authorities referred to at the
outset) (alteration in original).
36. Id. at 548.
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The principles required for a valid confession set forth in Bram
were heavily relied upon when the Court set the standards for the
constitutionality of plea bargaining.37 Yet, the Court took a more
liberal approach on how to apply plea bargaining guidelines in this
context.38 In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), defendant,
Brady, pled not guilty to federal charges of kidnapping. However,
upon learning that his co-defendant had confessed and would be
testifying against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty to avoid the
risk of receiving the death penalty.39 In seeking post-conviction
relief, Brady argued that the only reason he entered his guilty plea
was to avoid the possibility of the death penalty, and thus, it was
not voluntary on account of the coercive effects of the sentencing
scheme.40
The Court began its opinion by recognizing that “[a] guilty plea
is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and
discernment. U.S. Const. amend. V requires that such a plea be the
voluntary expression of a defendant's own choice.”41 Then, in
echoing Bram, it reinforced that “[w]aivers of constitutional rights
not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences.” Moreover, “[t]he agents of the State may not
produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental
coercion overbearing the will of a defendant.”42 However, the Court
created a separation between what was coercive and what was
voluntary when it found that although the possible death penalty
sentence Brady faced was the “but for” cause of his guilty plea,43
this did "not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid
as an involuntary act."44 Instead, the Court ultimately held that,
“unlike pleading guilty in response to threats, pleading guilty in
response to promises of more lenient treatment is voluntary.”45
This decision was clearly discordant with Bram, which
required that "to be admissible, [a confession] must be free and
voluntary: that is, it must not be extracted by any… threats or
violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence."46 Yet, the

37. Brady, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 744; Blank, supra note 29, at 2028.
40. Brady, 397 U.S. at 744.
41. Id. at 747 (alteration in original).
42. Id. at 748.
43. Blank, supra note 29, at 2045.
44. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 749 (finding that “the possibly coercive impact of
a promise of leniency was presumptively dissipated by the presence and advice
of counsel”).
45. Id.
46. See Bram, 168 U.S. at 543 (1897) (holding that “the general rule that
confessions must be free and voluntary, that is, not produced by inducements
engendering either hope or fear, is settled by the authorities referred to at the

2018]

Presumption of Waivability and Federal Rule of Evidence 410

845

Court justified this distinction on the grounds that unlike Bram,
Brady "had competent counsel and full opportunity to assess the
advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared with those
attending a plea of guilty."47 Furthermore, the Court provided even
greater latitude for governmental securitization of guilty pleas by
holding that “[a] voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the
light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because
later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty
premise.”48
Interestingly, the Court provided this latitude while
recognizing that “it has been estimated that about 90%, and
perhaps 95%, of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty;
between 70% and 85% of all felony convictions are estimated to be
by guilty plea.”49 Yet, the Court was not swayed by these statistics
as it held that the “mutuality of advantage” presented by plea
bargaining “perhaps explains the fact that at present well over
three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on
pleas of guilty.”50 Still, in another convoluted twist, the Brady
decision admitted “[o]f course, that the prevalence of guilty pleas is
explainable does not necessarily validate those pleas or the system
which produces them."51

outset”) (alteration in original).
47. Brady, 397 U.S. at 744; Blank, see supra note 29, at 2040 (observing that
“in an end-run around Bram, the Court treated the assistance of counsel as a
proxy for voluntariness in pleading, effectively establishing that a counseled
plea is presumptively valid”).
48. See id. at 749 (finding that a criminal defendant is not entitled to
withdraw his guilty plea “merely because he discovers long after the plea has
been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case
or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action”) (alteration in
original); Blank, supra note 29, at 2038 (discussing how “[t]he Brady Trilogy
marked the decisive moment in the Court's treatment of plea bargains” when
the Court “substantially undercut any argument that systemic problems such
as coercive sentencing schemes or peremptory bargaining tactics were
rendering large numbers of guilty pleas invalid”).
49. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (citing Donald J. Newman, Conviction:
The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
162, 168 (1967)).
50. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 (finding that defendants are “motivated at
least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be imposed
if there were a guilty verdict after a trial to judge or jury”).
51. Id. at 752-53; see generally Blank, supra note 29, at 2042 (finding that
“under the twin banners of ‘mutuality of advantage’ and ‘rehabilitation,’ the
Court definitively proclaimed the constitutionality of bargained-for guilty
pleas).
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B. Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Congressional
Intent
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a)
Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a) provides:
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the
following is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea
or participated in the plea discussions:
(1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn;
(2) a nolo contendere plea;
(3) a statement made during a proceeding on either (4) of those
pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable
state procedure; or
(4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for
the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a
guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.52

The application of Fed. R. Evid. 410(a) was first laid out in
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927), wherein the Court
held that withdrawn guilty pleas were inadmissible in federal
prosecutions.53 This is because “[a] plea of guilty differs in purpose
and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it
is itself a conviction” as nothing else is required, “a court has
nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”54 Accordingly, “[o]ut
of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful
that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily
after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences.”55 Therefore, “[w]hen one so pleads he may be held
bound. But, on timely application, the court will vacate a plea of
guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or given through
ignorance, fear or inadvertence.”56 In doing so, “[t]he court in
exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea
of not guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the
privilege seems fair and just.”57
2. Congressional intent
How Fed. R. Evid. 410 was intended to be governed was

52. FED. R. EVID. 410.
53. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 228 (1927).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 230 (finding that “to admit the withdrawn plea would…
effectively place the accused in a dilemma utterly inconsistent with the
decision to award him a trial”).
57. Id. at 231.

2018]

Presumption of Waivability and Federal Rule of Evidence 410

847

detailed in The Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary which
state, “[a]s adopted by the House, rule 410 would make inadmissible
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere subsequently withdrawn as well
as offers to make such pleas.”58 The Notes go on to say that “[s]uch
a rule is clearly justified as a means of encouraging pleading.
However, the House rule… render[s] inadmissible for any purpose
statements made in connection with these pleas or offers as well.”59
Furthermore, the Notes state “[a]s with compromise offers
generally… free communication is needed, and security against
having an offer of compromise or related statement admitted in
evidence effectively encourages it.”60 Ironically, in United States v.
Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285 (2005), this interpretation was recognized,
yet ignored by the United States Court for the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals when it agreed that “Congress has accepted… Fed. R.
Evid. 410 with their goal of permitting candid plea discussions,
serving personal as well as institutional interests.”61

C. Waiver of Rights
The precedent the Sylvester court relied upon lies in
Mezzanatto, the landmark case whereby the rights enshrined in
Fed. R. Evid. 410 were first deemed to be waivable by the Supreme
Court.62 There, appellant Gary Mezzanatto was charged with
possession of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1).63 At Mezzanatto's request, “the government held a plea
bargaining meeting with him where the prosecutor informed
Mezzanatto that any statements he made during the meeting could
be used to impeach any inconsistent testimony he offered at trial.”64
Mezzanatto agreed to this, and the meeting began but it did not
conclude in an agreement.65 At trial, Mezzanatto offered testimony
that was inconsistent with statements he made during the plea
negotiations and the government introduced the prior statements
to impeach Mezzanatto.66 Mezzanatto objected, on the grounds that
Fed. R. Evid. 410 deems evidence of a guilty plea that is later

58. Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules (2011).
59. See id. (stating that “in certain circumstances such statements should
be excluded. If, for example, a plea is vitiated because of coercion, statements
made in connection with the plea may also have been coerced and should be
inadmissible on that basis”).
60. Id.
61. See United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 203 (2005) (finding that
“any argument relying on congressional intent to promote candor is too weak to
justify refusing to allow use of plea statements in the government's case-inchief”).
62. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 202.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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withdrawn as inadmissible,67 but the trial court overruled the
objections, admitted the statements for impeachment, and the jury
found Mezzanatto guilty.68
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.69 There, the court
found that “the government should not be given the ability to
extract a waiver of these rules from a defendant who is in a weak
bargaining position.”70 Given the imbalance of bargaining power, it
was held that “[a] statutory right conferred on a private party, but
affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such
waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy.”71 The court
went on to admonish that “[t]o allow the government to enforce its
waiver agreement would… adversely affect the public interest in
efficient criminal case resolution.”72 This was due to the idea that
“to equate the waiver of these rules with that of an asserted
constitutional protection is a false equality.”73 Therefore, “[t]o write
in a waiver in a waiverless rule promulgated by the Supreme Court
and Congress, on the other hand, is not an inescapable duty.”74
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court overturned the
Ninth Circuit.75 Contrarian to the appellate decision, and Fed. R.
Evid. 410, the Court held that "the plea bargaining process
necessarily exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to
abandon a series of fundamental rights,” but it has “repeatedly
[been] held that the government may encourage a guilty plea by
offering substantial benefits in return for the plea.”76 More
specifically, “[a] party may waive any provision… of a statute,
intended for his benefit. The most basic rights of criminal
defendants are subject to waiver. A criminal defendant may
knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental
protections afforded by the Constitution.”77 Further, “absent some
affirmative indication of Congress' intent to preclude waiver,

67. Kercheval, 274 U.S. at 228.
68. Id.
69. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1458.
70. See id. at 1455 (finding that the government secured the attempted
waiver from Mezzanatto, “not as part of a plea bargain, but… for the
opportunity to enter into discussions that could have, but did not, lead to a plea
bargain”).
71. Id. at 1457; Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704, (1945).
72. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1458.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 196.
76. Id at 209-10 (alteration in original)
77. Id. at 208; see Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991). (finding
that “the most basic rights of criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver”);
see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (finding that double jeopardy
defense waivable by pretrial agreement); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 243, (1969) (holding that knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to jury trial, and right to
confront one's accusers).
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statutory provisions are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement
of the parties.”78 Therefore, without an “affirmative indication that
the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an
agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the pleastatement rules [under] Fed. R. Evid. 410… is valid and
enforceable.”79
It should be noted that in Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, she
agreed with the majority to the extent that “a waiver allowing the
Government to impeach with statements made during plea
negotiations is compatible with Congress' intent to promote plea
bargaining.”80 However, in a stark adumbration, Justice Ginsburg
warned that “a waiver to use such statements in the case-in-chief
would more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to
negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea bargaining.”81 However, given
that “the Government ha[d] not sought such a waiver,”82 this issue
was not undertaken in Mezzanatto. However, such a waiver and all
of its implications will comprise the proceeding sections of this
comment.

III. ANALYSIS
This section will detail how the presumption of waivability of
Fed. R. Evid. 410 became expanded to allow such evidence in the
prosecutor’s case-in-chief.83 Next, it will be shown how this illconceived presumption of waivability has spread across the judicial
landscape such that it is now the mainstay in Fed. R. Evid. 410
jurisprudence.84 This will be followed by a look into how pernicious
the expansion of the presumption of waivability in a prosecutor’s
case-in-chief is compared to impeachment, given the serious
difference in conviction effectiveness between the two types of
evidence.85 Finally, a look at the text surrounding Fed. R. Evid. 410
78. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 208; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465
(1938) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived); see
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-732 (1986) (finding that the prevailing party
in civil-rights action may waive its statutory eligibility for attorney's fees).
79. Id. at 212.
80. Id. at 220 (Ginsburg, J. concurring).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sylvester, 583 F. 3d. at 294.
84. United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1004 (2011) (holding that
“evidence from plea negotiations is ordinarily inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid.
410. But the protections of the rule may be waived”); see generally United States
v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 810 (2015) (holding that “a defendant can waive his Rule
410 protections”); see United States v. Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490
(finding that “under Rule 410, statements made in the course of plea
negotiations are inadmissible against the defendant, however this right of the
defendant is waivable by agreement”, unless there is “some affirmative
indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily”).
85. See Julia A. Keck, Recent Development: United States v. Sylvester: The
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and a defiance of the Congressional intent therefor will be
accounted to highlight the warning Justice Ginsburg set out in
Mezzanatto.86

A. Inception of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 Waivers
Fifteen years after Mezzanatto, the issue of prosecutorial
induced waivers of a criminal defendant’s Fed. R. Evid. 410 rights
reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Sylvester.87 There, Donald Sylvester was arrested and charged with
the murder of a federal witness who was set to testify against a
member of a large-scale drug conspiracy.88 Sylvester met with
prosecutors at the United States Attorney's Office, was advised of
his Miranda rights, and informed of the charges against him.89 The
prosecutor informed Sylvester that he had discretion to ask the
Attorney General to refrain from seeking the death penalty if
Sylvester agreed to a full confession that could be used against him
in court.90 Sylvester then agreed to waive his Fed. R. Evid. 41091
rights to object to the admission of incriminating statements at trial
in the event that plea negotiations failed. The prosecutor fulfilled
his promise in recommending to the Attorney General not to seek
capital punishment, however, Sylvester changed his mind and
decided to go to trial.
At trial, Sylvester moved pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 410, to
suppress statements he made during plea negotiations which the
district court denied, finding his waiver to be knowing and
voluntary.92 Sylvester’s statements were presented at trial and a
jury subsequently convicted him on ten felony counts involving
murder. He was sentenced to concurrent life sentences.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the
government may use a defendant's statements made in the course
of plea negotiations in its case-in-chief when the defendant, as a
condition to engaging in negotiations with the government,
knowingly and voluntarily waived all rights to object to such use.93
Extending the ruling set down in Mezzanatto, the court held the
government could.94 The court opined, “[o]rdinarily, under Fed. R.
Expansion of the Waiver of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 To Allow Case-in-Chief
Use of Plea Negotiation Statements, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1385, 1390 (2010) (detailing
how “[a] second problematic consequence is that the case-in-chief waiver
essentially serves as a waiver of the right to trial”).
86. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 214 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
87. Sylvester, 583 F.3d. 285.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 286.
91. FED. R. EVID. 410.
92. Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 287.
93. Id. at 288.
94. See id. at 289 (affirming that in the seminal case of United States v.
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Evid. 410… statements made by a defendant during plea
negotiations are inadmissible at trial. These Rules address both
individual and systemic concerns in their attempt to permit the
unrestrained candor which produces effective plea discussions.”95
The opinion went on to detail the dangers of waiving Fed. R. Evid.
41096 rights by acknowledging “that there is a disparity between the
parties' bargaining positions” which could lead to, “in theory an
innocent defendant [] execut[ing] such a waiver (and thus inject
false statements into the admissible record).”97 Furthermore, this
imbalance in bargaining power posed “[t]he hazard of an impulsive
and improvident response to a seeming but unreal advantage [that]
might prove coercive… [and] overbear the will of the defendant with
a meaningful defense.”98
In the face of this, however, the Fifth Circuit expanded on the
presumption that “[m]ost rights afforded criminal defendants… are
not inalienable.”99 In doing so, the court dismissed the
aforementioned prevarications concomitant to waiving Fed. R.
Evid. 410 rights and instead focused on the notion that to “ignore
relevant evidence of culpability simply because that evidence was
discovered during the course of plea negotiations would arguably
undermine the truth-seeking function of our criminal justice
system.”100 In light of this finding, the court went to on to hold that
“any argument relying on congressional intent to promote candor is
too weak to justify refusing to allow use of plea statements in the
government's case-in-chief. Impeachment waivers do not
undermine these efforts, and [this court] sees no reason why this
rationale should not extend to case-in-chief waivers as well.”101

B. Domino Theory
Sylvester now stands as the harbinger for permitting
prosecutors to seek a waiver of a criminal defendant’s Fed. R. Evid.
Mezzanatto, seven members of the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a criminal
defendant can waive Rule 410 protection and make otherwise excludable plea
statements admissible at trial absent some affirmative indication that the
agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily).
95. Id.
96. FED. R. EVID. 410.
97. Id. at 292.
98. See id. at 293 (finding that while even gross disparity in relative
bargaining power does not mean waiver is inherently unfair and coercive, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is not prepared to say that
rank difference in individual cases cannot render the defendant's plea
involuntary).
99. Id. at 290.
100. See id. at 291 (finding that presumably a defendant who is actually
guilty will still seek the benefit of his bargain, and remain candid even after
making a waiver, lest his deception invalidate his bargained-for agreement).
101. Id. at 294.
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410 rights in order to use the information garnered in plea
negotiations against the defendant in their case-in-chief; a trend
that has begun to sweep across several circuits.102
In United States v. Mitchell, the same issue was in front of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.103 There,
again, the court extrapolated out from Mezzanatto, holding that
“[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of Fed. R. Evid.
410 evidence for impeachment and during the government's
rebuttal case.”104 In line with that reasoning, the court held that
“[a]bsent some affirmative indication that the agreement was
entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive
the exclusionary provisions of Fed. R. Evid. 410 is valid and
enforceable.”105 Therefore, “[i]f a defendant engaged in plea
discussions signs a document providing that his or her statements
may be used at trial to impeach or rebut contrary testimony, Fed.
R. Evid. 410 will not bar the statements.”106
This was again echoed in United States v. Quiroga.107 There,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reiterated
that while “[u]nder Rule 410, statements made in the course of plea
negotiations are inadmissible against the defendant,” in the wake
of Mezzanatto, “[t]his right of the defendant, however, is waivable
by agreement, unless there is ‘some affirmative indication that the
agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily.’”108 The
contagion of Fed. R. Evid. 410 case-in-chief waivers, which extends
beyond the cases here listed,109 reveals how courts across the
country have begun to fall like dominos in accordance with
Sylvester, exposing an unjustified reading of Mezzanatto that is in
sharp contrast with the Congressional intent of Fed. R. Evid. 410,110
102. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1004; Jim, 786 F.3d at 810; Washburn, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10490.
103. See Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1002 (2011) (finding that “evidence from
plea negotiations is ordinarily inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 410 but the
protections of the rule may be waived”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Quiroga, 554 F.3d 1150, 1159 (2009).
108. Id. at 1154 (quoting Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210 (1995)).
109. See United States v. Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1028 (2010) (holding
that “the right in Fed. R. Evid. 410 to be protected from use of statements made
in the course of plea negotiations is waivable by agreement” unless it is shown
that “there is some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into
unknowingly or involuntarily”); see Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490
(finding that under Rule 410, “statements made in the course of plea
negotiations are inadmissible against the defendant, however this right of the
defendant is waivable by agreement”, unless there is “some affirmative
indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily”).
110. See Keck, supra note 84, at 1390 (stating that there was much debate
between the House and the Senate over the final wording of the Rule, “but the
statutory history indicated that Congress intended to prohibit the use of

2018]

Presumption of Waivability and Federal Rule of Evidence 410

853

precipitating a slippery slope of actual and ostensible adjudicative
debasements.111

C. Impeachment versus Case-In-Chief
Sylvester and its progeny stand for the proposition that
because the Supreme Court held in Mezzanatto that Fed. R. Evid.
410 rights against impeachment may be waived, a natural
extension of this holding permits waivers for statements made in
plea negotiations in a prosecutor’s case-in-chief.112 However, this is
a false equivalency that unjustly places the possibility of
impeachment on equal footing with the guaranty of a case-in-chief
admission of statement.113
The most glaring problem with equating impeachment with
arming prosecutor’s cases in chief with plea bargaining statements,
is that the former may only occur against witnesses who testify114,
while the latter may be used at trial, regardless.115 This is
important as “[t]he empirical evidence suggests that up to half of all
criminal defendants decline to testify in their defense.”116 If one was
to play this tape through to the end, it stands to reason, that if a
criminal defendant at one time felt compelled to enter into a plea
agreement, then subsequently withdrew from this course of action,
the likelihood of him or her taking the stand thereafter would be
even far less (especially now that they are threatened with
impeachment under Mezzanatto). As such, under Sylvester, et al.,
the admissibility of plea negotiation statements via a Fed. R. Evid.
410 waiver is tantamount to forfeiture of one’s right to a fair trial.117
This is true because when a defendant engages in plea discussions
that eventually fail, the use of his or her statements in the
prosecution's case-in-chief eliminates the need for the prosecution
to present other evidence to trial other than this de facto confession
statements made during plea negotiations to impeach the defendant at a later
date”).
111. Id. at 1393 (detailing how “Rule 410 is not a rule of evidence protecting
personal interests, and thus, cannot be waived by an individual defendant”).
112. Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 293 (2005); Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1002 (2011);
Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (2010).
113. See Keck, supra note 84, at 1391 (warning that an exception to Rule
410 “to allow use of otherwise inadmissible statements will eventually swallow
the Rule, completely undermining the purpose of enacting the Rule in the first
place.” Additionally, “Congress would not have enacted Rule 410 if it intended
the Rule to be circumvented so easily and frequently that circumvention became
the norm, rather than the exception”).
114. FED. R. EVID. 60.
115. FISHER, supra note 4.
116. Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants With Prior Convictions,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 301 (2008).
117. See Keck, supra note 84, at 1393 (warning that “[a] second problematic
consequence is that the case-in-chief waiver essentially serves as a waiver of
the right to trial”).
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to the crime.118
Conversely, “[a] lawyer impeaches a witness by casting doubt
on the witness’s accuracy or trustworthiness,” by either
contradicting previous statements or attacking the witness’s
character.119 The success of such impeachment attempts are
ultimately left to the jury to decide and, as a result, do not command
the same finality as de facto confessions found in Fed. R. Evid. 410
case-in-chief waivers (it goes without saying that should a criminal
defendant choose not testify then he or she may not be impeached
and any statements made during plea negotiations would not be
admitted at trial under Mezzanatto alone). Therefore, the notion
that because the Supreme Court found Fed. R. Evid. 410 rights
against impeachment to be waivable (which is an objectionable
stance as discussed below), in no way should lead to the automatic
presumption that case-in-chief waivers shall follow suit given the
sincere difference in the levels of severity each waiver poses to
criminal defendants.120

D. “Except as Otherwise Provided”
Even if one were to disagree with the discernibility of severity
between impeachment waivers and case-in-chief waivers, and find
as many courts now have, that the former logically leads to the
latter, it is important to note that waivers of any kind find no basis
in Fed. R. Evid. 410’s legislative intent121 and are contrarian to
established precedent regarding other federal rules of evidence as
shown below.122
In Crosby v. United States, the Court looked at whether a
federal district court was correct in permitting a trial in absentia to
proceed in the face of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 (“Fed.
R. Crim. P. 43”)123, which states that a defendant must be present
at every stage of trial "except as otherwise provided" by the Rule
and which lists situations in which a right to be present may be
waived.124 On certiorari, the Government conceded that Rule 43
“does not specifically authorize the trial in absentia of a defendant
who was not present at the beginning of his trial,” but argued that
"Rule 43 does not purport to contain a comprehensive listing of the
118. Id.
119. FISHER, supra note 4.
120. Keck, supra note 84 at 1390.
121. Michael S. Gershowitz, Supreme Court Review: Waiver Of The PleaStatement Rules, United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 808 (1995), 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439, 1445 (1996).
122. See Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748, 753 (1993) (holding that
Rule 43's express use of the limiting phrase "except as otherwise provided"
clearly indicates that the list of situations in which the trial may proceed
without the defendant is exclusive).
123. FED. R. OF CRIM. P. 43.
124. Crosby, 113 S. Ct. at 755.
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circumstances under which the right to be present may be
waived."125 In a unanimous decision, the Court disagreed and found
that “[t]he Rule declares explicitly: ‘The defendant shall be present
. . . at every stage of the trial . . . except as otherwise provided by
this rule’ (emphasis added).”126 Therefore, “the list of situations in
which the trial may proceed without the defendant is marked as
exclusive not by the ‘expression of one’ circumstance, but rather by
the express use of a limiting phrase. In that respect the language
and structure of the Rule could not be more clear.”127
As with Fed. R. Crim. P. 43, the Advisory Notes on Fed. R.
Evid. 410 contain the same limiting phrase and provide that “[t]he
Committee added the phrase ‘Except as otherwise provided by Act
of Congress’ to Rule 410 as submitted by the Court in order to
preserve particular congressional policy judgments as to the effect
of a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere.” (emphasis added).128 This
language, and the concomitant precedent found in Crosby, were
outright ignored by the majority in Mezzanatto.129 Instead, the
Court held that “[t]he Rules' failure to include an express waiverenabling clause does not demonstrate Congress' intent to preclude
waiver agreement.”130 “Rather,” the Court went on, “the Rules were
enacted against a background presumption that legal rights
generally, and evidentiary provisions specifically, are subject to
waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties.”131 However, Fed. R.
Evid. 410, like FRCP 43, clearly outlines the exceptions for when its
bar on admissibility may be circumvented and “[i]n that respect the
language and structure of the Rule could not be more clear.”132
Therefore, despite the presumption of waivability, Crosby's
unanimous interpretation of the “except as otherwise provided”
clause must transfer to Fed. R. Evid. 410, which not only contains
the same language, but also contains an exclusive list of
exceptions.133 This leads to the only possible logical conclusion,
125. Id. at 751.
126. Id. at 753.
127. Id.
128. H.R. REP. NO. 93–650 (2011).
129. Gershowitz, supra note 120, at 810 (showing how “the Mezzanatto
majority relied upon the alternative theory of field occupation to distinguish
Crosby and ignore its clear and unambiguous precedent”).
130. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 200.
131. See id. at 201 (holding that “respondent bears the responsibility of
identifying some affirmative basis for concluding that the Rules depart from the
presumption of waivability”).
132. Donald J. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or
Innocence Without Trial, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 162, 169 (1967); Crosby, 113
S. Ct. at 755.
133. FED. R. EVID. 410(b):
Exceptions. The court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3)
or (4): (1) in any proceeding in which another statement made during the
same plea or plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the
statements ought to be considered together; or (2) in a criminal
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which is that the majority erred in its ruling in Mezzanatto.

E. Defiance of Congressional Intent
The majority in Mezzanatto also ran afoul of the legislative
intent behind the enactment of Fed. R. Evid. 410.134 There, the
Court minimized Congress’ intent to protect against impediments
on a defendant's candor in plea discussions to a mere individual
right, thereby stripping the Rule of its true purpose.135 A fortiori,
Fed. R. Evid. 410 was not intended to simply create an individual
right, but rather a forum through which the criminal justice system
as a whole would embolden plea discussions and settlements.136 The
majority’s short-sided interpretation of Fed. R. Evid. 410, and the
Advisory Notes therefor, was taken to task in Justice Souter’s
dissent in Mezzanatto, where he opined that “if the generally
applicable… judicial policy of respecting waivers of rights and
privileges should conflict with a reading of the Rules as reasonably
construed to accord with the intent of Congress, there is no doubt
that congressional intent should prevail.”137 Furthermore “the
Rules are meant to serve the interest of the federal judicial system
(whose resources are controlled by Congress), by creating the
conditions understood by Congress to be effective in promoting
reasonable plea agreements.”138 Therefore, “[w]hether Congress
was right or wrong that unrestrained candor is necessary to
promote a reasonable number of plea agreements, Congress
assumed that there was such a need and meant to satisfy it by these
Rules.”139
Moreover, the majority presumed that the express-waiver
cases, e.g. Crosby, describe the limited circumstances wherein the
recognition of waiver is circumscribed, “and since the Rule[] in
question here say[s] nothing about ‘waiver’ as such,” the matter is
ended.140 Yet, there is “indeed, good reason to believe that Congress
rejected the general rule of waivability when it passed the Rule[] in
issue here.”141 This is evidenced by the fact that “Congress must
have understood that the judicial system's interest in candid plea
proceeding for perjury or false statement, if the defendant made the
statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel present.
134. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 214 (Souter, J. dissenting).
135. Id. at 215 (Souter, J. dissenting).
136. Id. at 216 (Souter, J. dissenting), citing Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 260 (1971)).
137. Id. at 215 (Souter, J. dissenting).
138. See id. (Souter, J. dissenting) (stating that the “provisions protecting a
defendant against use of statements made in his plea bargaining are thus
meant to create something more than a personal right shielding an individual
from his imprudence”).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 211 (alteration in original).
141. Id. at 212.
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discussions would be threatened by recognizing waivers under
Rules 410,” given that “the zone of unrestrained candor is
diminished whenever a defendant has to stop to think about the
amount of trouble his openness may cause him if the plea
negotiations fall through.”142 To ignore this fact would swallow up
Fed. R. Evid. 410, severely attenuating the protections it was
designed to afford.143 Therefore, the Mezzanatto majority not only
obscured the legislative intent of Fed. R. Evid. 410 by shrinking its
application to the criminal justice system at large, it actively read a
waiver presumption into the unambiguous language where none
existed. Accordingly, the decisions in Sylvester, et al., which used
Mezzanatto as a crutch to expand permissible waivers of Fed. R.
Evid. 410 rights should be rendered null and void as the derivation
for such an expansion has proven to be averse to sound legal
reasoning, standing precedent, and Congressional intent.144

IV. PROPOSAL
Undeniably, Fed. R. Evid. 410 has been placed at the center of
an imbroglio in the American criminal justice system. As has been
shown, the strength of protections afforded to criminal defendants
through Fed. R. Evid. 410 has deteriorated over time as affixed by
prosecutors and affirmed by courts. At first, the Court took an
unequivocal stance in Kercheval against denying criminal
defendants the rights enshrined in Fed. R. Evid. 410.145 Then, the
Court swiftly vanquished the purpose and effect of Fed. R. Evid. 410
in Mezzanatto by holding that the rights therein may be waived
such that any statements a criminal defendant makes during plea
negotiations may be brought up for impeachment at trial.146
However, this trend did not stop there, as recently several federal
district and appellate courts have begun to hold that Mezzanatto
opened the door for criminal defendants to not only waive their Fed.
R. Evid. 410 rights for impeachment purposes, but to waive them so
prosecutors may use plea negotiation statements during the
government’s case-in-chief.147 This waiver amounts to nothing short
of a defendant losing his or her right to a fair trial148 and
discourages the practice of plea bargaining – a practice Fed. R. Evid.
410 was enacted to promote.149 In order to stymie the deleterious
142. Id. at 218.
143. Gershowitz, supra note 116, at 809.
144. Keck, supra note 106, at 1390; supra note at 121; Mezzanatto, 513 U.S.
at 215 (Souter, J. dissenting).
145. Kercheval, 274 U.S. at 228.
146. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 215.
147. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285; Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997; Jim, 786 F.3d 802;
Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1022; Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490.
148. Keck, supra note 84, at 1393. A second problematic consequence is that
the case-in-chief waiver essentially serves as a waiver of the right to trial.
149. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 216 (Souter, J. dissenting).

858

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:839

effects case-in-chief waivers present, this article proposes that at
least one of three actions be taken: (1) the Supreme Court directly
overturn Mezzanatto; (2) the Supreme Court review a case on Fed.
R. Evid. 410 case-in-chief waivers and find against them; and/or (3)
Congress acts to explicitly amend the language of Fed. R. Evid. 410
to indicate waivers of the rights therein are impermissible.

A. Overturning Mezzanatto
Given the difference in severity between impeachment and
case-in-chief waivers detailed in section III, it is hard to imagine
that courts would find justification for the latter without the former.
A verbis ad verbera. This is evidenced by the fact that the courts
that have presumed case-in-chief waivers did so by relying on the
Mezzanatto decision.150 Furthermore, it is illuminating when
peering into how not only courts, but prosecutors viewed the
availability of such waivers ante this ruling that case-in-chief
waivers were never an issue prior to Mezzanatto. It is difficult, then,
to argue that a direct correlation, if not causation, does not exist
between Mezzanatto151 and the current degradation of Fed. R. Evid.
410 found in the subsequent cases.152
If the Court were to overturn Mezzanatto, the lower courts
would then be forced to revisit case-in-chief waivers. Upon doing so,
the bedrock of current justifications finding in favor of case-in-chief
waivers would be erased, leaving courts in a much weaker position
to substantiate its contemporary theories. Inevitably, courts would
have to rely on the unambiguous language of Fed. R. Evid. 410 and
the clear congressional intent behind enacting it. This would force
them to find the exceptions provided within the Rule itself are the
only permissible “waivers” allowed under this Rule. This would
then permit the true essence of Fed. R. Evid. 410 to be reestablished – permitting criminal defendants to once again speak
candidly during plea negotiations. It would also allow such
defendants to take the stand without the fear of impeachment,
rightfully providing them an unabashed opportunity to defend
directly on their own behalf.

150. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285; Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997; Jim, 786 F.3d 802;
Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1022; Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490.
151. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 220 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (finding that
“[a] waiver to use such statements in the case-in-chief would more severely
undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea
bargaining”).
152. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285; Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997; Jim, 786 F.3d 802;
Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1022; Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490.
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B. A Direct Decision on Fed. R. Evid. 410 Case-In-Chief
Waivers
A more direct way in which case-in-chief waivers could be
prohibited is if the Supreme Court tackled this issue head-on. As it
stands currently, case-in-chief waivers have only been addressed as
high as the appellate level with nothing on the docket for the
Supreme Court’s January 2018 docket.153 However, given the
reluctance of the Court to directly overturn its prior decisions,154
this is probably the more likely source of restitution for Fed. R. Evid.
410 rights. In doing so, the Court could finally address the
forewarning Justice Ginsburg laid out in her concurrence in
Mezzanatto wherein she advised that “a waiver to use such
statements in the case-in-chief would more severely undermine a
defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea
bargaining.”155 It has now become imperative that the Court as
whole to recognize the dangers posed by case-in-chief waivers
Justice Ginsburg so intuitively picked up on before this issue ever
truly came to light.156 The recent expansion of Mezzanatto’s holding
is not only contrarian to language of Fed. R. Evid. 410,157 but to the
Congressional intent for enacting the rule,158 and the Court’s
previous precedent.159 By granting certiorari on this issue, it would
permit the Court the opportunity to slam the door shut on the
misconstrued opinions160 that have read its decision in Mezzanatto
as opening up the opportunity for such waivers.

C. Congressional Action
Finally, if the courts will not act, Congress must. Certainly,
Congress must recognize that the adjudications rendered in
Mezzanatto, Sylvester, et al.,161 has directly contradicted its clear
intentions for enacting Fed. R. Evid. 410.162 Consequently, the
153. Amy Howe, Justices Release January Calendar, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 17,
2017) www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/justices-release-january-calendar/.
154. See generally Government Publishing Office, Supreme Court Decisions
Overruled By Subsequent Decision (Nov. 17, 2017) www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-12.pdf (stating that only 220
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court have been later overturned).
155. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 220 (Ginsburg, J. concurring).
156. Id.
157. Donald J. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or
Innocence Without Trial, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 162, 168 (1967).
158. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 214 (Souter, J. dissenting).
159. Crosby, 113 S. Ct. at 755.
160. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285; Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997; Jim, 786 F.3d 802;
Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1022; Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490.
161. Jim, 786 F.3d 802; Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1022; Mitchell, 633 F.3d
997; Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285; Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490.
162. Jim, 786 F.3d 802; Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1022; Mitchell, 633 F.3d
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current judicial landscape underlying this issue sits on faulty
ground that cannot be supported by the duly elected representatives
of the people who in their collective wisdom set out clear guidelines
for how plea negotiations, and the information garnered therein,
should be governed. This dichotomy invokes the countermajoritarian difficulty courts consistently face wherein a
government that derives its legitimacy from majority rule,
effectuates its laws through unelected officials.163 Still, the entire
basis of the Mezzanatto decision rested on the presumption of
waivability, of course not found in the Rule’s language.”164
Therefore, should Congress amend Fed. R. Evid. 410 such that it
contained language that either expressly denied waivers of its
rights, or limited waivers to certain situations, not including casein-chief waivers, it would pull the rug out from under Mezzanatto
and its progeny.165

D. Effects of Inaction
If these proposals remain merely theoretical, the system as-is,
will continue to render injurious effects on criminal defendants, the
criminal justice system, and society at large. The greatest threat
case-in-chief waivers pose are their potential to lead to wrongful
convictions. It has been well documented that interrogation166 and
plea negotiation techniques are designed to put the government in
a domineering position over the defendant167 – an imbalance of
power that was recognized, yet ignored in Mezzanatto.168 During
these proceedings the government’s “goals are to convince a suspect
that the authorities know he is guilty, to cut off a suspect's denials
of guilt, and to provide a suspect with a motive for the crime that
will appear to lessen his blame.”169 These techniques have become
so effective that they have led to an incalculable amount of innocent
defendants confessing to crimes they never actually committed.170
What this means is that should a false confession be procured
997; Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490.
163. Kenneth Ward, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and Legal Realist
Perspectives of Law: The Place of Law In Contemporary Constitutional Theory,
18 J. L. & POLITICS 851, 857 (2002).
164. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201.
165. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285; Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997; Jim, 786 F.3d 802;
Mayer, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1022; Washburn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490.
166. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and The Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV . 105, 110 (1997).
167. FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, AND JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2013).
168. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210.
169. INBAU, supra note 166 at 79-81.
170. Id. at 48, 80; Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations,
Confessions And Testimony 235-40, 260-73 (John Wiley & Sons 2003) (1992);
Richard Ofshe, Coerced Confessions: The Logic of Seemingly Irrational Action,
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through these hyper-effective techniques during a plea negotiation,
and a defendant later withdraws, this mendacious assertion the
defendant was contrived into providing will be used against him at
trial, all but rendering him or her guilty of the charged offense. This
is especially troubling as it was held in Sylvester that “[a] voluntary
plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable
law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions
indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.”171 The
implications this poses to a criminal defendant are obvious and
severe.172 Under the current paradigm, not only will a criminal
defendant be held accountable for statements made as a result of
coercive techniques during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the fact
that this plea “rested on a faulty premise” has been held as
essentially harmless error as to the final ruling.173
Per the criminal justice system, defendants will be less inclined
to enter plea negotiations which not only threatens the pecuniary
resources of the judiciary,174 it also dissuades defendants who are
likely to give up information during plea negotiations in order to
lessen their own sentences from doing so.175
Finally, in regard to society at large, a wrongful conviction
poses several threats including, but not limited to: putting the
wrong suspect behind bars; allowing the actual criminal to remain
in and prey on society; the wasting of taxpayer funded proceedings
(for the trial of the wrong defendant, the ostensible trial of the true
defendant, and/or the imprisonment of the individual who has been
wrongfully convicted); and a loss of public confidence in the criminal
justice system.176 Incontrovertibly, when considering all of these
ailments together, ample justification is provided for why judicial,
legislative, or combined action must be taken to thwart the
pernicious effects Fed. R. Evid. 410 case-in-chief waivers have on a
micro and macro scale.177
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the current jurisprudence upon which Fed. R.
Evid. 410 case-in-chief waivers is based, is founded on faulty
premises that distort Fed. R. Evid. 410’s unambiguous language,
ignore the Congressional intent behind enacting the Rule, and
wrongfully and injuriously expand upon the Supreme Court’s
improvident precedent on this issue. The malignant implications of
this misplaced reasoning pose serious risks and harms to criminal
defendants, the criminal justice system, and society at large. It is
imperative, then, that swift action be taken by the judiciary, the
legislature, or both, to ameliorate the devastating effects Fed. R.
Evid. 410 case-in-chief waivers present as federal district and
circuits around the country have begun to accept their
implementation.

